Mainstreaming Methodology for Estimating Costs of Crime
Contents
2. Economics of crime and criminal justice
4. Previous research on the costs of crime
5. Costing Principles and Methodologies
5.1 Basic Principles for Costing Crime
5.1.1 Social Costs versus External Costs
5.1.2 Aggregate versus Individual Costs
5.1.4 Who bears the burden of crime?
5.1.5 “Top down” versus “Bottom up” approaches
5.1.7 “Incidence” versus “prevalence” based costs
5.1.8 Discounting to Present Value
5.1.9 Transferability of Cost Estimates
5.1.10 Confidence Intervals, Uncertainties and Missing Costs
5.2 Methodologies for Estimating the Cost of Crime
5.2.1 Costs in Anticipation of Crime
5.2.2 Costs as a Consequence of Crime
5.2.3 Costs in Response to Crime
5.2.4 “Top Down” Approach to Crime Cost Estimation
6. Reporting and recording of crime
7. The costs of drug and alcohol misuse
9. Costs of crimes against business and government
10. Estimating the costs of criminal careers
11. Cost of crime estimates, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the economics of crime prevention
12. Distributional issues in the costs of crime
The provision of a criminal justice system (CJS) is a central function of the modern state. Provision is costly but essential to ensuring the smooth functioning of civil society. It is perhaps surprising then that economic arguments about resource allocation in the CJS play a comparatively small role in wider discussion of crime and crime control.
The purpose of this review of literature related to measuring the costs of crime is to help elucidate how the benefits from effective crime prevention efforts can be valued. Without knowledge of the scale of this contribution it is difficult to imagine how reasoned judgments can be made about the appropriate degree of priority to be accorded to competing projects within the CJS or to decisions about spending on the CJS relative to other areas of government activity such as the provision of defence, education or health services.
There are substantial technical complexities that have to be confronted in making cost of crime estimates. These complexities extend more broadly than the purely economic domain. Decisions about what actions are to be criminalised vary across states and reflect many influences, with the result that the definition of offence types is far from universal. Many of the losses from crime entail psychological harm as well as financial and economic loss. An increase in the fear of crime on the part of the wider public may result from an offence, so third-party effects have to be accounted for.
The ‘costs of crime’ literature necessarily therefore draws on a wide spectrum ranging from abstract concerns about legal philosophy and the nature of the state to very narrow technical issues such as how to measure the benefits from crime prevention projects where, say, it is suspected that intervention in one area will displace criminal activity to some other area.
In order to convey a sense of the breadth and richness of this literature we have split the survey into a number of topic areas. The disciplines represented in the various sections below include economics, law and criminology. Inevitably some of the material is somewhat specialist but we have endeavoured to make it reasonably accessible to a non-specialist audience. It goes without saying that the list of references is by no means exhaustive. The list of references at the end has been exported from an EndNote database, which runs in parallel with this review. The intention is to give readers access to this parallel resource wherever possible.
The classical foundation for interest in an ‘economic’ view of criminal justice and the role of criminal sanctions is (Beccaria 1767). Another pre-Becker source d iscussing the extent to which punishment is explained by general deterrence is (Andenaes 1966) .
Contemporary work on the economics of crime has for the most part been inspired by the paper by (G. S. Becker 1968). This path-breaking work developed the idea that the decision to commit a crime could be looked at in the same way as other kinds of decisions, namely by comparing an action’s costs and payoffs. A prospective criminal weighs the subjective costs and benefits from offending and goes ahead if the net benefits are positive. The benefits are the pay-off from the offence whilst the costs are primarily the product of the probability of being caught and the scale of the sanction to be expected in the event of being caught: (R. Cooter, T. Ulen 2007). This gives rise to a deterrence-based approach in which a sufficiently well-tailored set of sanctions could be implemented to pre-empt virtually all offences.
It is not always appreciated that this approach relies on there being information about the costs of crime. If the losses from an offence cannot be readily assessed then it is much more difficult to determine an appropriate set of sanctions for it and the degree of priority it is to be accorded within the Criminal Justice System.
Many aspects of the Becker model have been pursued in the literature. Becker & Stigler (Stigler 1974) expand on Becker’s 1968 seminar article to discuss incentives for enforcers. (Polinsky and Shavell 1984) develop the model of optimal law enforcement with different risk behaviour. (Polinsky and Shavell 1984) expand the model of optimal law enforcement to non-
monetary sanctions and show that imprisonment should be used infrequently. Posner (1980a) applies the economic model to white-collar crime. Posner (1980b) discusses the economic model from the perspective of retribution and related theories of punishment. (Posner 1985) goes beyond the model of optimal law enforcement, proposing an economic theory of substantive criminal law in particular with respect to torts and other wrongdoings. (Stigler 1970) introduces marginal deterrence as a goal of punishment and thereby disproves the results of Becker’s 1968 seminal paper with respect to maximal fines. (Shavell 1985) proposes a comprehensive economic theory of non-monetary sanctions.
For a quick introduction to criminal law and economics see (Eide 2000) or (Mookherjee 1997) . For the most up to date survey on criminal law and economics see (A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell 2007) . For the most up to date survey on empirical criminal law and economics see (Levitt and Miles 2007) . See also chapters 20 to 25 of (Shavell 2004) .
For some more recent contributions see the following. (Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989) provides an overview of the economics of legal conflict resolution; although it looks primarily at private litigation. (Garoupa 1997) offers a more technical survey of the economic model of law enforcement. (Kessler and Levitt 1999) examine econometric strategies to distinguish deterrence effects from incapacitation since aggregate date is usually problematic in that respect. (Lewin and Trumbull 1990) discuss the economic assumption that crime generates costs and benefits; in particular, it addresses the possibility that crime has a positive social value. (Miceli 1991) introduces fairness considerations into the economic model of law enforcement. (Polinsky and Shavell 2000) survey the economic model of public law enforcement. (Shavell 1987) proposes an economic theory of criminal incapacitation as an alternative to deterrence. (Shavell 1991) distinguishes general enforcement from crime-specific enforcement, looking at complementarities and substitution effects. (Shavell 1993) provides a general framework to understand law enforcement, including criminal law and tort law. And finally (Bouckaert and Geest 1992) offer a bibliography of law and economics.
Addressing questions on the definition of “law” is always a difficult task (Dworkin 2006) , and addressing questions that have to do with the definition of criminal law is not an exception. To the lay person the criminal law is a series of definitions of offences (what academics call “the special part”), whereas criminal law scholars tend to think of it as a set of general principles and conditions of criminal liability. (On the “General part” of the criminal law, see (Green 2000) . What, as a matter of law, is treated as a “crime” in a particular jurisdiction is obviously determined by the legislation of that jurisdiction, but in general it can be said that a crime is any activity which is punishable by means of the criminal process (Fletcher 1998) . Although this definition is tautologous, it is important to understand the outer boundaries of the concept, if we are to make meaningful estimates of the costs of crime. In order to do we can limit ourselves to an analytical approach focused on identifying the central features of contemporary criminal law systems (Duff and Zalta 2002) : we do not need to undertake a metaphysical investigation about what a crime “really” is (but see (Moore 1997) .
In general, criminal law is used in circumstances where society wants to express its disapproval of an act or omission by imposing significant personal sanctions against the person responsible, with typically some notion of moral or personal responsibility (Ashworth 2000; Ashworth 2003) .
In order to capture the personal responsibility element, the vast majority of criminal infractions require that the perpetrator act either intentionally or negligently (mens rea). In Common Law countries penal systems usually contain a small subset of “strict liability” (no fault) offences, a much contested category (Simester 2005) . Continental criminal lawyers regard the existence of strict liability pockets in criminal law with suspicion (Roxin 2006) . However, differences between the systems are more apparent than real. Both in terms of procedure and the consequences of their infringement “strict liability offences” in Common Law jurisdictions are treated in a way similar to what in Continental legal systems are described as regulatory “violations” and taken to be outside the realm of the criminal law (Duff and Zalta 2002) .
Most legal systems draw a distinction between more serious and less serious offences, for the purposes of determining both process and available punishments. So, for example, more serious offences, which are often punished by imprisonment are tried in higher courts and/or liability is determined by a jury. In the common law jurisdictions the relevant distinction has been between a “felony” and “misdemeanour” (Hall 1960) . Civil law countries follow a similar distinction under various names (e.g.: “Verbrechen-Vergehen” or “Delitos y faltas”, see (Stratenwerth and Kuhlen 2004) (Mir Puig 2006). In some common law countries, the terminology has been changed to, for example, that between “indictable” and “summary” offences (Ormerod 2005) . In England and Wales, some crimes are known as “either way offences” in that the defendant can choose between being tried summarily in the lower court or on indictment in the higher court (Ormerod 2005) .
Between the legal definition of crime and the common understanding of the concept there is a large difference. The common understanding is to what may be described as “mainstream” crimes (sometimes referred to as “mala in se”), conduct which is morally wrongful and leading to criminal offences in almost all mature societies and “regulatory crimes” (or “mala prohibita”), conduct which is morally neutral but which is prohibited in a particular jurisdiction by specific legislation (Wootton 1963) , (Wells 2001) . Since the distinction is not always easy to apply, it is best to treat the matter as on a spectrum between the two concepts (Sutherland 1945) . Mala in se, or mainstream crimes, are typically classified into offences against the person (violent and non-violent), property and public order (Ormerod 2005) . Mala prohibita defy classification because they cover a huge range of regulatory controls including those governing commercial, industrial and professional activity (Ogus 2004) .
Another frequently encountered distinction is between “blue collar” and “white collar crime”. The problem is that these concepts have different connotations in different contexts (Bensman 1988) . Since its first use the concept of “white collar crime” has oscillated between the reference to the (high) social status of the criminal and the type of crime and the fact that it was committed in the course of one’s occupation (Sutherland 1940, 1945). This latter use prevails today (Weisburd and Waring 2001) . So, also, in modern times “blue collar crime” tends to refer to the nature of the crime and the situation from which it arises, rather than to the perpetrator. Thus it covers crimes of violence, but also “street crime”, including vandalism and shoplifting, while “white collar crime is associated with "... those illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and which are not dependent upon the application or threat of physical force or violence” (FBI 1989 ) . “White collar” crime also significantly overlaps with “corporate crime” (Simpson 2002) . The latter can be interpreted very broadly to include “conduct of a corporation or of employees which is proscribed or punishable by law” (Braithwaite 1984) , but more narrowly as where that illegality is pursued for organizational rather than individual ends (Jamieson 1994) .
“Organized crime” is different again and is, perhaps, even more elusive with there being very many and very varied attempts at definition (Von Lampe 2007) (has collected over 100 different definitions). Perhaps the core ideas are that the prohibited activity should be committed by two or more individuals, that the means include violence and/or deception; and that the objective is some form of power, political or economic (Maltz 1976) : see also (Paoli 2002) .
Although most types of mainstream crime are treated as such in most jurisdictions, there is obviously a wide variation both in the definitions of readily acknowledged offences and in the outer boundaries of what constitutes criminal behaviour: (Beirne 1983; Pradel 2002) and for a valuable introduction to the problems of comparing national definitions of crime, see (Nijboer 2005) . Identifying the core meanings of familiar crimes is important not only for the purpose of compiling and comparing data on the commission of crimes in different jurisdictions (see (European Sourcebook 2006) ; and, on victim surveys, (Block and Block 1984) ), but also for applying international legal instruments, such as those protecting human rights, to criminal procedures (Guinchard 2005) . Identifying the core is particularly problematic in the areas of fraud (Green 2000; Attorney General's Office 2006) and computer crime (Tavani 2000) or cybercrime (Gordon 2006) .
Since legal definitions are created for legal purposes, it has been questioned how useful they are for other purposes; for example, they are not directly translatable into sociological indices, so that what is, in the latter context, “normal” is nevertheless defined as a crime (Wilkins 2004) . Some efforts have been made to define and classify crimes according to the amount of social harm they create (Tifft 2006) , but inevitably such labels and classification are based on subjective notions of harm and the definitions become not only culturally-dependent, but also normative (Ruggiero 2007) .
A related but conceptually different matter is that of the adequate crime definition (a normative question). Since criminal law employs the harshest state sanctions in order to ensure compliance, there is an academic consensus that it should only be used as a last resort or ultima ratio (Jareborg 2005) . Policy makers, however, do not seem too convinced (Husak 2004) . (Simester and Sullivan 2000) estimate the number of criminal statutes in England to be about 8,000, and the excessive quantity and breadth of criminal offences has also troubled other European commentators (Fiandaca and Musco 2007) . Some attempts have been made to draw a line between conduct deserving of criminal sanctions and conduct deserving moral sanction or non criminal legal response. Continental lawyers have insisted that immoral conduct that does not injure or endanger a “legal good” cannot be properly criminalized “Rechtsgüterschutz Prinzip”, see (Amelung 1972) . A parallel development has taken place in Common Law jurisdictions: under the “harm principle” no conduct should be criminalized unless it causes “harm to others” (Feinberg 1984) . Given the vagueness and malleability of the expressions used (“legal good”, “harm to others”), however, these approaches have not been successful in providing a clear view as to the proper reach of the criminal law: history as well as actual practice show both principles fail to set any real constraints on the scope of the criminal law (Harcourt 2001; Hefendehl, von Hirsch et al. 2002; Burney and von Hirsch 2006) .
In the final analysis the notion of what is a ‘crime’ is determined by the content of the criminal law: a crime is what the law says is a crime. One merit of taking an economic approach to law is that it can be used to develop some positive propositions about what kinds of activities are likely to be criminalised. By viewing criminal law as one amongst several instruments that can be used as a means of deterring socially-harmful activity it becomes easier to develop theories about legal development and law reform and to understand how the evolution of criminal law may be a reflection of changes in underlying economic and social conditions: (Bowles, Faure et al. 2008).
Research into the costs of crime has been going on for a comparatively long time. Overviews of the history of this research can be found in (Czabański 2008) and (Cohen 2005)). Estimates of the costs of crime in the U.S. date back to (Smith 1901) and the (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement 1931), with an early review of the literature and methodologies by Gray (C. M. Gray 1979). While most of these studies have been conducted by academic researchers, much of the underlying data has been taken from government sources. For example, crime victimisation surveys that have been running for many years in the US and the UK collect data on out-of-pocket expenses arising from crime and a number of other relevant elements such as time off work and spending on measures to prevent crime such as locks.
A brief review of estimates in various countries follows:
US
Aside from the very early studies noted above, there have been a number of studies in the U.S. over the past 20+ years. (Phillips and Votey 1981) included some of the intangible costs of crime in their study. (Zedlewski 1985) estimated tangible costs. Further developments on intangible costs were instigated by (Cohen 1988a; Cohen 1988b), (Cohen 1994), and (Cohen 2004). (Cohen 1994) provided the first comprehensive cost of crime estimates that included criminal justice and prevention costs in addition to victim costs. While most of the Cohen et al. studies were government funded (and (Miller, Cohen et al. 1996) was published by the National Institute of Justice), the only official government studies have focused on the out-of-pocket victim losses (e.g. (Klaus 1994).
The cost of gun crimes was estimated by (Cook and Ludwig 2000) and (Ludwig 2001). The cost of drug abuse has also been studied extensively in the U.S. beginning with (Harwood 1998). These estimates have been updated by (Rice 1990), and the (Office of National Drug Control Policy 2004).
UK
The Home Office, beginning with (Brand and Price 2000), is the first country to begin a systematic, ongoing assessment of the costs of crime. It is also the first such assessment undertaken directly by a government agency. Further work on the same model ha s been done by (R. Dubourg et al. 2005). See also work commissioned by the Home Office on the costs of drug abuse (Godfrey, Eaton et al. 2002).
In parallel with the studies conducted by academic and government economists there have been many international, survey-based reports on crime against business conducted by private-sector (and other) organisations. Some of these developments are reviewed in section 10 below.
Other EU Countries
Research on the costs of crime in other EU Member States is sparse. An exception is France (Palle and Godefroy 1998; Palle 2000).
Australia
Analysts have estimated the cost of crime in Australia periodically: (Walker 1992), (Walker 1997),(Mayhew 2003) & Rollings (2008).
Canada
The tangible costs of violence against women (medical costs, lost wages, government programs, etc.) have been estimated by (Greaves 1995). Several studies have been conducted in Canada on the costs of crime that attempt to incorporate intangible victim losses as well as direct losses: (Welsh 1995), and (Brantingham and Easton 1998).
Latin America
The Inter-American Development Bank commissioned a series of studies in the late 1990s that estimated the cost of violence (including government expenditures and victim losses including intangibles) in Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and El Salvador. See (Londoño 1997) for a summary. (Fundación Mexicana para la Salud 1997) estimated the costs in Mexico, while (Cruz 1998) estimated these costs in El Salvador. (Morrison and Orlando. 1999) studied the cost of domestic violence in Chile and Nicaragua by estimating lifetime earnings differential for victims. More recently, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) financed another study on the cost of violence in El Salvador (United Nations Development Program 2005). For a recent review see also the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2007) reports the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) as estimating the cost of crime in Central America to be 14.2% of GDP, including expenses for law enforcement, healthcare and social programmes, as well as lost foreign investment.
New Zealand
Following the model of (Brand and Price 2000), (Roper 2006) estimated the costs of crime in New Zealand.
This section provides a comprehensive listing of principles and methods for estimating the costs of street crime and references thereto. While many of the approaches also apply to estimating other forms of crime including drug abuse, fraud, and corporate and white collar crimes, these topics are dealt with in separate sections.
Before estimating costs of crime it is important that the analyst specify the underlying goal of the exercise – whose costs are being estimated and for what purpose? If the underlying purpose is to estimate the cost to taxpayers, that is a much different exercise than estimating the cost to victims or the cost to society as a whole. While there are certainly legitimate reasons why one might want a less than comprehensive accounting, one generally should start from the perspective of estimating the full “social costs” or “external costs” (discussed below) of crime. Most important, however, the analyst should explicitly state the underlying concept being estimated and the methodology.
Economists generally start with a presumption that they want to estimate the “social costs” of harmful activities such as pollution or crime. However, (Cohen 1998) argues that the relevant concept for analysis of crime control programs is that of “external” costs. The concepts of social costs and external costs are closely related but not identical. “External costs” are simply the costs imposed by one person on another, where the latter person does not voluntarily accept this negative consequence – often termed an “externality” by economists. “Social costs” are costs that reduce the aggregate well-being of society.
While oftentimes external and social costs are identical, this is not always the case. The value of stolen property is an often cited example. Some economists have argued that stolen property is an “external” but not technically a “social” cost, since the offender can enjoy the use of the stolen property. For example, Cook (1983) argues that the relevant concept should be the “social cost” - which would exclude transfers of money or property. By excluding transfers, Cook (1983) is considering the offender a member of society and thus worthy of inclusion in the social welfare function. In contrast, Trumbull (1990) argues that those who violate the criminal law are not entitled to have their utility counted in the social welfare function, i.e., their gain or loss is to be ignored. Similarly, in the case of victimless crimes (e.g. drug abuse, prostitution, and gambling), one might argue that the “social costs” of these crimes are zero or small (once factoring in the welfare of the participants who enjoy these activities). Yet, as Cohen (2005) argues, these activities impose significant external costs (such as reduced quality of neighbourhoods, medical costs borne by taxpayers, etc.)
Authors are not in agreement about whether to use external or social costs. Cohen (1988a), French et al. (1991), Miller et al. (1996), Brand and Price (2000), Dubourg et al. (2005), and others have argued in favor of the external cost approach. Anderson (1999) takes the opposite approach and explicitly takes transfers out of his cost estimates – although they are shown as a separate item. Whichever conceptualization of costs is ultimately adopted, it is important to explicitly describe the underlying approach and, if possible, provide estimates utilizing both – i.e. identify both the full costs as well as the portion that are determined to be outside the scope of the exercise so that the reader can make her own choice about which concept to use. Thus, if transfer payments are to be excluded from the final estimates, they should at least be identified.
While most efforts to estimate the costs of crime focus on individual crime types, some authors (see e.g. Anderson 1999) have attempted to estimate costs from aggregate data such as total government spending on police, courts, and the criminal justice system; private expenditures on security alarms and other precautionary expenditures. Such an approach might also look at aggregate victimization costs from government or hospital surveys. These approaches might be useful for understanding the magnitude of the crime problem relative to other measures such as health expenditures or GDP. They are not suitable for other purposes, however, such as comparing harm by types of crimes or conducting benefit-cost analyses of programs designed to reduce certain types of crimes. Of course, some crime costs are more easily estimated on an aggregate basis (especially general government expenditures that are not targeted towards one type of crime). However, even in these cases, methodologies exist to apportion the costs by type of crime. Thus, while estimating the aggregate costs of crime might be a useful first step – and might be less resource intensive – estimating the costs (and prevalence) of individual crimes is ultimately preferable.
Various authors have categorized the burdens of crime in slightly different – yet complementary ways. The economics of crime literature has traditionally distinguished between three types of costs (Demmert, 1979: 2-5):
(1) costs caused directly by criminal behaviour (i.e., external costs imposed by the offender),
(2) costs society incurs in response to crime to deter or prevent future incidents or to exact retribution, and
(3) costs incurred by the offender (such as the opportunity cost of the offender's time while either engaging in the offence or being punished, if he or she otherwise could have been employed in productive activity).
An alternative formulation by Brand and Price (2000) is:
The Brand and Price (2000) characterization largely focuses on the first two of Demmert’s crime cost types and ignores offender costs. It also ignores some of the more difficult costs that Cohen, Miller and Rossman (1994) identified – such as the cost to victim’s families, justice or over-deterrence. While this categorization has some intuitive appeal and has been followed by subsequent Home Office reports, note that it is often difficult to sort out which category costs belong to. For example, while Brand and Price (2000) include criminal justice expenditures in their “response to crime” category –it may also have an “avoidance/deterrent” role beyond pure incapacitation and hence look more like a cost “in anticipation” of crime.
Cohen, Miller and Rossman (1994), Cohen (2000, 2005) started from the Demmert (1979) list and progressively expanded it into a comprehensive taxonomy. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 regroup that taxonomy into the three types of crime costs suggested by Brand and Price (2000). Thus,Becker (1968) also would include property transfers but he theorized that they approximate true social costs if the market for fencing was competitive . Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide a comprehensive taxonomy that is consistent with the Brand and Price approach. The first table includes costs in anticipation and the consequences of crime. The second table details society’s response to crime. Regardless of how these costs are grouped, it is useful to start with a comprehensive listing – which allows researchers and policy makers to understand which costs are included and which are not. Enumerating costs or benefits that are not monetized is a fundamental principle of benefit-cost analysis (see for example Zerbe and Bellas, 2006). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 also include information on “who bears the cost” of crime, which is the subject of the next section.
Aside from the primary goal of estimating the social or external costs of crime, a secondary goal that is often of interest to policy makers is to identify specific components of costs based on who bears the burden. Which costs are enumerated will depend upon the intended audience and policy prescriptions. For example, government agencies might be interested in the tax implications of criminal justice policies. Potential victims (including businesses) might be interested in the effect of increased crime on their avoidance behaviour or prevention expenses. Insurance companies might be interested in estimating changes in loss experiences. While useful, it should be recognized that these are narrowly defined goals – not social benefit-cost analyses. Thus, they should ideally be conducted in the context of first identifying all costs and secondly identifying who bears the burden.
One issue that has not been studied widely is the incidence of the burden of crime. While researchers have estimated the cost of crime to victims, for example, they have not focused on the burden on victims relative to their income or wealth. While some victimization studies have focused on the socio-demographics characteristics of victims, cost of crime studies have generally not yet made this correspondence to fully understand the burden of crime.
There are two basic approaches to estimating the costs of crime. The most prevalent to date has been a “bottom up” approach that attempts to piece together the various component crime costs enumerated in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. That is the approach taken by Cohen (1988a) who estimated the cost of crime to victims. Cohen et al. (1994), Brand and Price (2000) and Dubourg et al. (2005) added the cost of prevention and the criminal justice system to victim costs. However, as noted by Nagin (2001), these “bottom up” approaches tend to ignore some very important components of the costs of crime – including the “fear of crime,” expenditures or actions taken by the public to avoid the risk of crime, as well as any residual loss to the community in terms of social cohesion, community development, etc. Recent papers by Dolan et al. (2005) and Moore (2006) have attempted to estimate the cost of “fear of crime,” but these approaches are still being refined and still do not fully encompass all of the cost categories enumerated in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, nor the full characterization sought by Nagin (2001).
An alternative approach is thus to estimate costs from the “top down.” Although there are several methodologies that can be adopted (discussed further below), these ‘holistic’ approaches attempt to elicit information on the public’s willingness-to-pay for reduced crime. Examples include Ludwig and Cook (2001) and Cohen et al. (2004).
In theory, the ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches should lead to the same estimates if the latter is all inclusive. The extent to which these two approaches yield similar results has been explored by Cohen (2008a), who concludes that to date, the bottom up approaches have not fully captured the costs of crime. Nevertheless, there is merit in both approaches. While the top down approach is likely to be more comprehensive, it does not allow for a disaggregation of crime cost components. Since there will oftentimes be considerably interest in many of these cost components – especially the cost to victims and the government – it is recommended that both approaches be utilized and further developed. This has the added benefit of applying two different methodologies that allow for some bounding of the cost of crime estimates.
Many costs are not observable as direct monetary exchanges. Economists have long recognized the notion of “opportunity costs” as being the conceptual approach to valuing such burdens. The opportunity cost of a good or service is simply its value in the next best alternative – or put differently, what must be given up in exchange for that good or service. Thus, for example, if a victim must spend on average 10 hours meeting with police, prosecutors, and attending court proceedings, it is important to include the opportunity cost of the victim’s time. In this case, the opportunity cost would generally be based on the hourly earning capacity of victims. Additional opportunity costs that should be estimated include the value of pain, suffering and lost quality of life to victims, as well as fear to the public at large. Cost of crime estimates should endeavour to include opportunity costs – not only the financial burden of crime.
The health economics literature generally distinguishes between “incidence-based” and “prevalence-based” costs. An “incidence-based” cost of crime estimate would attempt to look at each individual crime episode and identify all of the costs. An injury that is sustained today may continue to have consequences and impose costs for many years. Thus, if one is interested in the cost of crime in any one year, it is important to decide whether this should be defined as the costs actually incurred during that year (“prevalence” based costs), or the costs imposed that year even if they are not realized until many years down the road (“incidence” based costs). Cost estimates based on incidence count both present and future costs in the year in which the injury-cost stream began (Hartunian et al., 1981). Costs based on prevalence count all costs of injury that were incurred in a given year, regardless of when the injuries occurred. Incidence-based estimates indicate how much could be saved by preventing future incidents and are thus most relevant for criminal justice policy analysis. Prevalence-based estimates may be used to provide insight into the cost savings attainable through improved treatment of existing injuries and are of more interest to those in the public health community interested in estimating medical care needs.
Costs incurred in the future (i.e., more than one year post-victimization) must be discounted to “present value.” Most ‘cost of crime’ studies to date have used a rate of between 2% and 3.5% per year, which is consistent with the "real" (i.e., net of inflation) discount rate for worker wages over time, and the real consumer interest rate over time. Cohen (1988a), Cohen et al. (1994), and Miller et al. (1999) use a 2% discount rate. Brand and Price (2000) and Dubourg et al. (2005) use a 3.5% rate.
Statistical modelling suggests workers apply a two percent discount rate when they trade off possible loss of future life years against extra earnings in the present (see Moore and Viscusi, 1989). In the U.S., the Congressional Budget Office concluded from a review of the economic evidence that the most appropriate discount rate for public decision making was 2% (Hartman, 1990). A similar consensus appears to have developed around a 3% net discount rate in health care economics (Gold et al., 1996). In the U.S., some government agencies have routinely used higher net discount rates of around 10%, and the Office of Management and Budget (1992) requires a 7% discount rate for regulatory policy analysis. The U.K. government uses a 3.5% discount rate for analysis of public spending projects (U.K. HM Treasury, 2003).
In most costing exercises, some cost components will be unavailable due to lack of data or resource constraints. In some instances, it might be appropriate to transfer information from other countries to fill these gaps. Which cost categories are reasonably transferable might depend upon which county has data and which is being estimated. For example, if two countries have very similar court systems but different wage rates, it might be reasonable to transfer the estimated number of hours spent by court personnel but use the home country’s wage rates to estimate actual costs.
All cost of crime estimates are subject to uncertainties – that is why they are “estimates.” Depending upon the source of data and methods of collection, some of the uncertainties can be modeled and confidence intervals can be constructed. Alternatively, estimates might be expressed as ranges if reasonable assumptions would provide such alternatives. Whenever possible, the “best estimate” should be provided along with either a range or confidence intervals.
There are many different approaches to measuring the costs of crime. Broadly, these methods can be described as either “direct” or “indirect.” Direct methods use primary sources such as crime victim surveys, public surveys, or budgets of the criminal justice system. Indirect methods use secondary sources such as property values or jury awards. This section reviews the state-of-the-art and some of the complicating factors in identifying and measuring both the tangible and intangible costs of crime. It follows Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Note that throughout this section, we routinely reference and compare the coverage and approaches used in four sources: Cohen et al. (1994) and Anderson (1999) who estimated victim and criminal justice costs in the U.S.; Brand and Price (2000) who estimated similar costs in the U.K.; and Dubourg et al. (2005) which updates the latter study and includes some additional cost categories. These three sources are the most comprehensive studies to date and include the most cost categories.
5.2.1 Costs in Anticipation of Crime
5.2.1.1 Avoidance Costs
Individuals and businesses take many precautions to avoid becoming the victim of a crime. Some of these avoidance behaviours involve monetary expenditures such as locks, burglar alarms, taking taxis at night instead of walking, or maintaining a guard dog. Others, however, involve opportunity costs such as the time required to lock one’s home and set the burglar alarm, taking a longer walking route in order to avoid a high crime area, etc. Estimating the magnitude of these costs is difficult in both cases. In the case of direct outlays, it is often the case that expenditures are made for multiple purposes. Thus, for example, a guard dog might also provide companionship, and purchase of a firearm might be both for purposes of protection and sport. Sorting out the marginal cost due to crime is thus difficult. Quantifying opportunity costs involves additional complexity, since we do not actually pay money when we lock a door or walk a longer distance to avoid a high crime area. Anderson (1999) attempted to estimate many of these costs in the aggregate, including: guards, alarm systems, passes for business access, locks, safes and vaults, small arms and ammunition, surveillance cameras, safety lighting, protection fences and gates, airport security, non-lethal weaponry (e.g. mace), theft insurance, electronic retail article surveillance, guard dogs, and library theft detection. While in some cases, one could attribute all costs to one crime type (perhaps burglar alarms, for example), this is not always the case.
Brand and Price (2000) and Dubourg (2005) include two components of direct expenditures - the cost of residential and business security and the cost of property insurance administration/overhead. These figures come from aggregate industry estimates in the U.K. They are then allocated to individual crimes based on the distribution of out-of-pocket losses by type of crime. For example, if home burglary accounts for 50% of property losses, 50% of security expenditures would be applied to this crime and divided by the number of burglaries to arrive at an estimate of the costs per incident.
Further development of the opportunity costs of avoidance behaviour is needed. Public surveys could identify specific avoidance behaviours engaged in (see e.g. Clotfelter, 1978). If the amount of time spent in each activity is elicited, the opportunity cost could be estimated based on average wage rates. This approach was used by Anderson (1999) in valuing the time spent by potential victims locking their homes, businesses and cars. Alternatively, contingent valuation surveys could be conducted to determine the public’s willingness-to-pay to reduce these avoidance behaviours (see Section 5.2.4 for details on these type studies).
5.2.1.2 Fear of Crime by the Public
Fear of crime by the public is one of the least studied areas of costs as it is one of the most difficult to estimate. While fear might induce the public to take costly actions such as purchase burglar alarms or change their daily behaviours, these costs are accounted for elsewhere as costs in anticipation of crime. Even after taking these precautionary actions, however, residual fear remains. The fact that people would be willing to pay real money to alleviate that fear means that in theory its value can be quantified.
To date, two methodologies have been adopted to estimate the value of fear: stated preference surveys and life satisfaction studies. However, other methodologies might be used in the future, such as revealed preferences (see for example, the discussion in Section 5.2.4 on “top down” approaches). The two existing studies discussed next should be viewed as preliminary as the methods are still being developed.
Moore (2006) analyzed the European Social Survey which includes questions on life satisfaction as well as how safe the respondent feels walking in their neighbourhood. Using multiple regression analysis to identify the marginal effect of feeling safe and household income on life satisfaction, Moore (2006) estimated the monetary equivalent of moving from one level of safety to another. One cautionary note is that the survey did not specifically ask about “fear.” It is possible, for example, that one does not feel safe walking in their neighbourhood but yet has no residual fear at all – i.e., they simply don’t walk in their neighbourhood. In that case, the value might be thought of as a proxy for the opportunity cost of living in a safer neighbourhood. These are subtle issues that have yet to be examined thoroughly. Part of the problem is that to date, researchers have not conducted these studies with the main purpose of understanding the crime-life satisfaction link. Instead, researchers like Moore out of necessity used existing surveys and done the best they can with the data they inherited. Future surveys designed to study the crime-life satisfaction link might be better able to sort out these effects.
Dolan and Peasgood (2007) used the results of a survey which asked individuals how often and how fearful they were of being victimized, and made assumptions about the QALYs lost as a result of different fear incidents. Combining this with an estimate of the cost of a QALY provided estimates of the cost of incidents of fear. Once again, this first attempt borrows from other non-crime-related sources (e.g. the QALY loss from a fearful event is not directly linked to fear of crime). Future surveys designed to directly study the QALY loss from crime would thus advance the field.
5.2.1.3 Government Crime Prevention Programs
In theory it should be relatively easy to tally up the cost of government programs designed to prevent crime. In reality, even detailed budget documents often combine categories and programs themselves often serve multiple purposes. Anderson (1999, Table 3) reviewed the U.S. budget in 1997 and identified more than 30 categories of expenditures including such diverse areas as child abuse and family violence programs, child support enforcement, customs service and numerous regulatory enforcement programs, and security guards. However, as noted above, many of these programs also serve non-criminal goals. Moreover, as Anderson notes, some costs are excluded – such as the costs of receptionists at an office (as opposed to security guards) that might also serve as a deterrent to illegal entry and theft from a building. Note that even if these costs are estimated, it is not always possible to attribute them to any particular crime type.
The U.K. estimates do not currently include these government program costs.
5.2.1.4 Non-governmental Crime Prevention Programs
Examples of non-governmental crime prevention programs include Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and local neighbourhood watch programs. Anderson (1999) included the cost of some of these programs – notably MADD. Even the costs of programs that do not involve direct expenditures – such as neighbourhood watch programs – could be estimated based on the opportunity cost of time by program participants. As in the case of governmental programs, not all expenditures focus on individual crime types and thus it might be difficult to attribute these costs to one particular crime.
The U.K. estimates do not currently include these costs.
The primary method of obtaining data on victim property loss has been victimization surveys such as the National Criminal Victimization Survey in the U.S., the British Crime Survey, and the International Criminal Victimization Survey. This is the method used by virtually all efforts to cost crime. While the victim ultimately bears the burden of property losses, a portion of those losses might be insured. In that case, an additional amount can be added to account for the administrative costs of insurance reimbursement. This approach has been followed by Cohen (1994), Anderson (1999), and more recently by Dubourg et al. (2005).
Crimes against households are generally better documented than crimes against other sorts of targets such as private or government organisations. This is partly because victim surveys have been conducted more widely and partly because commentators have become increasingly sceptical about the value of recorded crime data as a reliable indicator of the prevalence of crime at household level.
Household surveys of crime victimisation have been conducted in the UK since 1982, although its origins can be traced back to earlier work on victims of crime and of non-criminal personal injury: Sparks et al (1977).
The British Crime Survey (BCS) asks adults in private households about their experience of victimisation in the previous 12 months. Households responding positively to screening questions about being victims are asked a further series of detailed questions about the offence and about their losses from it. These questions cover many of the areas required for estimation of the costs of crime including property loss, time off work (lost output) and contact with health services (personal injury costs), although not necessarily in ways which are amenable to valuation in economic terms. The BCS has grown into a very large operation indeed with tens of thousands households annually being asked hundreds of questions.
Many other countries have developed their own household crime victimization surveys, although these surveys vary widely in their breadth and depth of coverage. For further discussion of the International Crime Survey conducted at intervals in various countries in the EU and further afield see Van Dijk et al (2005), Alvazzi del Frate (2004), Mayhew & Van Dijk (1997).
One of the problems with victimization surveys is that victims might not necessarily use a consistent valuation method. For example, is the loss based on the cost of purchase, replacement cost, or depreciated value? Thus, victimization surveys should be designed to provide consistent – and economically meaningful – responses.
One alternative method of estimating property losses in the absence of victim surveys is to obtain data directly from the insurance industry. These data are typically available for property crimes such as home burglary, motor vehicle thefts. However, these data would not include uninsured losses – which on average are likely to be smaller than insured losses. Thus, some adjustments would need to be made to estimate aggregate losses.
There are several reasons why victims might lose time from work, school or otherwise not be able to spend time at routine housework. In addition to physical or psychological injury that might cause such absences, a motor vehicle theft victim, for example, might have to spend time filling out insurance and police forms, shopping for a new car, obtaining a new bank loan, etc. Data on time lost is often available from victim surveys. Regardless of whether or not the victim actually lost any wages, time away from work is a loss in productivity – and someone (employer or government) will bear that burden. Thus, all time lost should be valued.
In theory, the appropriate measure of the value of time is the opportunity cost – which will generally be the hourly wage rate plus fringe benefits of the employee. While one could in theory use the average wage of crime victims (perhaps taken directly from victim surveys if asked), in practice, researchers have instead used the average hourly earnings in the country. This is not only done due to data availability, but also for reasons of ‘equity.’ Even though crime victims might earn less than average in the population, as a matter of policy, previous researchers have explicitly valued victim losses based on the ‘average’ in the population. This is the approach taken by Cohen (1988a), Cohen et al. (1994), Anderson (1999), Miller et al. (1999), Brand and Price (2000), and Dubourg et al. (2005).
Services performed in the home have value to the individual and to the rest of the family. When someone is injured, they might be unable to perform some or all of their normal household chores such as cleaning, cooking, lawn care, and home maintenance. These services either need to be replaced by another family member, by hiring outside domestic help, or they will simply go undone. In some cases, the individual who is injured will be able to perform the services, but at a slower pace. This additional time spent doing chores is also a loss, since that time could have been spent on more productive or leisurely activities. In the absence of survey data on the extent to which victims are unable to perform household services, Cohen et al. (1994) inferred the number of days of lost household services from NCVS data on lost workdays (see also Cohen, 2005 for details). To monetize these losses, they relied upon estimates of the replacement cost of household services (see for example, Douglass, Kenney and Miller, 1990; Krueger and Ward, 2001). To date, household services have not been valued in crime cost estimates in the U.K.
Children who are victims of crime might lose days at school. Even in the absence of lost schooldays directly resulting from physical victimization, the psychological injuries associated with victimization might be large – which might affect a student’s learning and/or long-term educational attainment. Regardless, at least in theory, school students who are victimized also suffer a productivity loss. Indeed, MacMillian (2000) has estimated long-term effects of lost wages to victims of violence in the U.S. However, MacMillian’s estimates were not crime specific. The problem of estimating the number of lost school days is similar to household services – there are virtually no such survey data available. However, based on the age distribution of victims, one can infer lost school days by using victim survey data on lost workdays by adults. Valuing lost school days is more problematic, but as a first approximation can be based on the cost of a day in school. This approach was taken by Miller et al. (1996) and Cohen (2005). The U.K. estimates have not to date included any loss in school days.
5.2.2.5 Medical and Mental Health Care Costs
While in theory, victimization surveys might ask about medical costs (as they do in the United States), victims are likely to significantly underestimate them as they rarely bear the full burden of medical costs. Even if they know the costs, they are likely to be limited to short-term losses to date. Thus, most comprehensive cost of crime studies estimate medical costs indirectly by inferring them from the distribution of injuries reported in the victim surveys. This information can be combined with average medical costs by diagnoses taken from hospital or other health care data. This approach has been followed by Cohen (1988a), Cohen et al. (1994), Miller et al. (1996), Anderson (1999), and Dubourg et al. (2005). Note that victim surveys often ignore members of the household below age 12 – thus additional estimates of the costs of child abuse oftentimes need to be made. In addition, depending upon the percentage of victim medical costs estimated to be reimbursed by insurance, overhead costs might be added.
Mental health care costs are among the least studied costs of crime. Although there are many clinical studies documenting the importance of mental health care for crime victims, victimization surveys do not generally ask respondents about their mental health care following victimization. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is now well established as a clinical diagnosis often caused by criminal victimization. Cohen and Miller (1998) surveyed mental health care professionals directly and estimated the number of victims by crime type that utilize mental health services, length of treatment, and costs per crime. While often overlooked, this component of costs can be substantial – especially for the crimes of rape and child abuse. For instance, PTSD accounts for 60 per cent of the emotional and physical costs of rape estimated by Dubourg et al. (2005). One important finding of Cohen and Miller (1998) was that mental health costs might not only be incurred by the victim, but in some cases by the victim’s family or loved ones. This is particularly true of the family of murder victims. Miller et al. (1996) incorporated these higher mental health care costs estimates, which were also adopted by Anderson (1999).
5.2.2.6 Pain, Suffering and the Lost Quality of Life
The intangible victim costs of pain, suffering and reduced quality of life are the most difficult to measure and subject to considerable uncertainty and controversy. Yet, when measured, they are inevitably the largest component of victim costs. Cohen (1988a), Cohen et al. (1994), and Miller et al. (1996) analyzed jury awards for these intangible losses to victims of crime in the U.S. and used these as the basis for estimating costs. Note that juries in the U.S. are charged with compensating victims to “make them whole,” which specifically includes a component for pain, suffering and lost quality of life. Cohen (2005) has a discussion on the appropriateness of using these ex post “compensation” measures as opposed to ex ante willingness-to-pay measures. However, even if theoretically appropriate, this method should not used in countries where juries do not routinely award damages on that basis. Brand and Price (2000) made the assumption that the impacts of violent crime were equivalent to impacts sustained in non-fatal road accidents, and ‘transferred’ values estimated for the latter by the UK Department for Transport as proxies for the physical and emotional costs of violence. Dubourg et al. (2005) addressed the weakness in this approach by using a methodology (detailed by Dolan et al (2005)) based on reductions in the “quality adjusted life years” (QALY) associated with physical injuries, with evidence of the incidence of different injuries associated with different crimes obtained from a number of sources, including the BCS itself. For property crimes in the U.K., they utilize a question on the British Crime Survey that asks, “Apart from your financial losses what would be a reasonable financial sum to compensate you for the upset and inconvenience you and/or your household suffered?”
Because this is such a significant cost component and it is not directly observable, considerable methodological developments are still taking place. One method involves refinement of the QALY to take into account more crime types (see Dolan et al., 2005). Atkinson et al. (2005) used a contingent valuation survey to estimate respondents’ willingness to pay to avoid the physical symptoms of violent crimes. Another method involves the use of life satisfaction surveys (see Cohen. 2008a for details of these various methods).
One area that has not yet been included in many crime cost studies is the loss of affection to family members and their pain, suffering and grief. This could be studied using similar methodologies. Cohen et al. (1994) included estimates of this loss for children of rape victims based on estimates of the number of children who witness their mother’s victimization. These losses have not been included in the U.K. estimates to date.
5.2.2.7 Victim Support Services
Victim service organizations provide many services to victims of crime including counselling, temporary shelter, and financial assistance. They might be government organizations or non-profits – sometimes with partial government funding. Most victim assistance programs focus on violent crimes – often sexual assaults, child abuse and domestic violence, although property victims may also be served. In many cases, any expenditure data available will be aggregated across all crime types. Thus, it is often difficult to allocate the funding across crimes. In addition, many such organizations rely upon volunteer time – which could be valued using opportunity costs (or average wage rates). Cohen et al. (1994) estimate the cost of governmental and non-governmental victim service programs, but did not have data on the amount of volunteer time spent and thus did not include any value of their time. Anderson (1999), Brand and Price (2000) and Dubourg et al. (2005) estimate only nationally-financed governmental victim service programs and do not estimate expenditures by other governmental organizations, nonprofit organizations or volunteer time.
To date, due to data availability, all of these estimates have had to allocate costs across crime types somewhat arbitrarily based on the distribution of offences covered by these programs. However, on a per-crime basis, this is a relatively small cost item for most crimes. The exception appears to be rape and child abuse. For example, even on a “per victim” basis, Cohen et al. (1994) estimated that the cost of victim services for all rape victims who received victim services was $311 in 1987 - nearly the same as medical costs. However, they also noted that if they were able to include the value of victim service volunteers, this cost might double or triple. Thus, this area might be worthy of further research.
5.2.2.8 Legal expenses associated with tort claims
Depending upon the legal liability rules and the “ability to pay,” victims might go to court to obtain compensation for their losses. While the defendant in these law suits might be the offender, it is often a third party who has deeper pockets and might be liable due to negligence (e.g. failure to provide adequate lighting or security nearby an establishment that is known to have a crime problem). These lawsuits are expensive – with legal costs for both plaintiff and defendant estimated to be more than the value recovered itself. Even in the U.S., where these lawsuits are more likely to take place, Cohen (2005) estimated that there are only about 10,000 such lawsuits annually – representing less than ½ or 1% of all victimizations. To date, no cost estimates have included this component.
5.2.2.9 Long-term consequences of victimizations
While many of the victim costs identified above occur over a long term period, there are other long-term costs not fully accounted for above. For example, victims of child abuse are known to be at higher risk of future offending behaviour themselves. As another example, burglary victims are known to move at a higher rate following victimization – thus incurring substantial transactions and moving costs. To date, cost of crime studies have not attempted to incorporate these costs.
In committing a crime, offenders might utilize time and resources that would otherwise go into socially desirable activities. For example, the time they spend engaged in illegal activities could be instead devoted to productive employment. Similarly, resources devoted to the criminal’s “tools of the trade” such as weapons, getaway vehicles, and specialized equipment could be diverted to products that provide social value. We are unaware of any estimates of these costs, except in the case of drug offenders. In that case, estimates have been made of the time devoted to the drug trade and an estimate of the opportunity cost of the offender’s time is included as a cost. See Cohen (1998) and Cohen and Piquero (2007). Note that in sanctioning offenders, there are other costs to consider, see Section 5.2.3.8.
In the aggregate, it might be relatively straightforward to estimate the cost of police although this is not necessarily true as some countries with decentralized police forces will not have a central repository of such data. However, disaggregated crime cost data is more difficult to obtain. In addition to determining what portion of police time is devoted to crime prevention or investigation or crime (as opposed to traffic duties, etc.), one must determine the allocation of this time by crime type. Cohen et al. (1994) and Brand and Price (1999) both relied upon a few cities that collected such data from their police forces. Dubourg et al. (2005) used results from a national activity-based costing exercise of all police forces in England and Wales. This divided hours worked by officer grade between crime and non-crime activities, and then between crime incident- and non-incident-related activities. Non-incident-related crime activity was then allocated across crime incidents pro rata as an overhead. Once they obtain the estimated cost per crime, they divide this amount by the ratio of reported to recorded crimes to arrive at crime-specific “per victimization” estimates of police costs. It is not known how these studies generalize across their respective countries. Moolenaar (2007) has estimated police costs in The Netherlands by type of crime based on the frequency of criminal offences reported to police (assuming that the cost per reported crime is the same across crime types) and then divided each category by the number of reported crimes to arrive at an estimate of the cost per recorded crime. Gardlund (2007) has obtained crime-specific cost estimates from data collected in Sweden directly by police who record their daily time activities.
Some countries have systems for recording police time allocation such as the Activity Based Costing (ABC) system used in England: (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary 1998). Even these systems are rarely implemented sufficiently thoroughly to support an allocation of police activity to offence types. Elsewhere one-off studies and surveys may be conducted in efforts to identify the costs of policing particular offence types. (N. Donnelly et al. 2007) mounted a special survey of police activity in order to make estimates of the law enforcement costs associated with alcohol-related crime in New South Wales. The Donnelly study relies on a distinction between ‘reactive’, proactive’ and ‘associated’ police duties which is potentially useful. Cost is known (from studies of police efficiency, such as Leigh and Simper, 2000 and (Amor Diez-Ticio, Mar Mancebon 2002) to vary across police force areas depending on size, offence mix and so on.
Estimation of the costs of prosecution is much the same as police in Section 5.2.3.1. The same issues and estimation procedures apply – although now one must divide the “per unit cost of prosecution” by the ratio of prosecutions to reported crime in order to arrive at crime-specific cost estimates. Similar approaches have been followed by the same authors cited in Section 5.2.3.1. Empirical data on prosecution costs in England and Wales can be found in Crown Prosecution Service (2007).
Economists have looked at the implications of fixed prosecutor budgets for the prioritising of prosecutions, although we are not aware of detailed studies of prosecution costs: (S. Baker, C. Mezzetti 2001).
Estimation of the costs of court proceedings is much the same as police in Section 5.2.3.1. The same issues and estimation procedures apply – although now one must divide the “per unit cost of court time” by the ratio of trials to reported crime in order to arrive at crime-specific cost estimates. Similar approaches have been followed by the same authors cited in Section 5.2.3.1. The costs of courts include the provision of court buildings plus the costs of court staff including judges.
The cost of defending oneself in a criminal trial is borne either by the accused offender or the state. In many countries (certainly in the EU) there is a requirement that the state should provide legal services to any defendant who is at risk of being imprisoned.
While information about the cost of state-provided legal defence should be readily available, it is unlikely to be available for private costs. Cohen et al. (1994) estimated the latter based on the percentage of defendants who were covered by government indigent defence programs. However, absent better data, they assumed the hourly cost of private legal defence is the same as the cost of government-provided defence. Thus, their estimate is conservative. Anderson (1999) only includes that portion of defence costs paid for by the federal, state or local governments. While none of these costs were included in Brand and Price (2000), Dubourg et al. (2005) do include legal aid and non legal-aid defence costs paid for by the federal government.
5.2.3.5 Criminal Sanctions (Prison, Probation, Community Service, Fines, etc.)
Estimation of the costs of criminal sanctions is generally done in much the same way as for police costs: Section 5.2.3.1. The same issues and estimation procedures apply – although now one must divide the “per unit cost of sanctions” by the ratio of sanctioned offenders to reported crime in order to arrive at crime-specific cost estimates. If possible, data on actual time-served by offence type should be used to estimate per unit costs. This approach has been followed by Cohen et al. (1994) and Dubourg et al. (2005). When this method is used the future costs of the sanction have to be discounted at an appropriate rate in order to derive the present value of providing a prison place. This means that the total estimated cost of prison sanctions for the crimes committed in a given year will exceed the total prison budget in that year.
By contrast, Brand and Price (2000), Moolenaar (2007) and Gardlund (2007) did not have time-served data for their countries. Instead, they had data on the aggregate costs of each major category (e.g. total costs of prisons), and then divided by the number of sanctioned offenders (assuming equal length of prison sentences by crime type). To arrive at costs per reported crime, they then multiplied by the ratio of sanctioned versus reported offences for each crime type. This approach effectively constrains the total cost of prison sanction for a given year’s offences to be equal to the prison budget for that year. only had information on the population of prison inmates at a given time, rather than the total number of offenders sanctioned in a year. To the extent that average prison sentences for some crimes exceed one year, this will tend to underestimate the prison cost liability incurred as a result of one year’s offences of that type.
Note that in the case of fines, the monetary amount assessed the offender is not included in the cost estimates – only the administrative costs associated with fine collection. The fine itself is a transfer payment to the government – neither a social nor external cost of crime.
5.2.3.6 Victim and Witness Costs
Victims and witnesses might spend considerable time dealing with police, prosecutors, and the courts. While victimization surveys in the U.S. and U.K. ask victims about the number of lost workdays – which would include time spent dealing with legal issues – even these estimates would not include the amount of time outside normal working hours. To date, no crime cost estimates have included this component. These costs represent costs to the victim or witness of complying with the demands of the Criminal Justice System. There may be a further round of potentially substantial costs that result from the intimidation of victims and witnesses: (Bowles, Garcia Reyes and Garoupa, 2007).
The opportunity cost of a juror’s time would be an appropriate measure of the cost of juror service. Dubourg et al. (2005) value the lost output associated with juror time by the wage rate averaged across the employed and unemployed population. Thus they do not attach a value to any time which jurors might lose outside of standard work hours. Juror time has not been valued in other studies previously.
Many governments have victim compensation programs. These programs often reimburse a portion of the victim’s out-of-pocket costs (but virtually never reimburse for intangible costs). Cohen et al. (1994) estimated victim compensation by type of crime in the U.S. While these costs were not included in Brand and Price (2000), Dubourg et al. (2005) did include victim compensation costs in their estimate of the cost of victim services. Care must be taken not to double count when estimating victim compensation. While the administrative costs of such programs should be considered a cost of crime, it would be double-counting to include both the gross victim loss as well as compensation payments. Thus, if victim cash compensation is included, any other estimates of victim losses should be net of any such payments.
5.2.3.9 Offender Costs: Lost Productivity
As noted in Section 5.5.1, whether or not to include the costs borne by offenders is controversial – as some would argue the criminal’s utility is not to be counted within the social welfare function. However, even if their personal utility were not included, some offender-related costs are born by their families or society at large.
Offenders who are incarcerated will generally be unable to be gainfully employed in the legitimate sector (with some exceptions such as weekend confinements or in-prison jobs). Lost wages and fringe benefits are not only a loss to the offender, but they also represent real resources lost to the economy. Cohen et al. (1994) estimated the annual earnings of offenders based on U.S. government survey data of offenders serving time in jail or prison. See also Cohen (2005) for details on these calculations and sources. Anderson (1999) took a different approach assuming that offenders would earn the same as the average earnings in the country. The rationale for this was Anderson’s goal of estimating the costs of crime based on the assumption that the counter-factual was ‘no crime.’ In other words, Anderson (1999) was assuming that if society had no crime, those who currently are chronic offenders would instead be gainfully employed. While this assumption is reasonable for the stated purpose, it is not appropriate for most costing exercises where the goal is to estimate the costs or benefits of marginal changes in the offending rate or the cost of an individual crime. To date, estimates in the U.K. have not included these losses.
In addition to lost productivity while in prison, there is growing evidence that incarceration itself reduces the long-term employment and earnings potential of offenders. This loss has not yet been quantified and included in cost of crime estimates.
5.2.3.10 Victimization of Offenders while Incarcerated
Finally, one potential cost associated with jailing offenders is the higher rate of injury and death while in prison – including violent offences, suicides, and sexually transmitted diseases (see Cohen 2005). While there might be a high rate of these incidents among prison inmates, one would need to conduct a careful study to determine whether this is an “excess rate” over what these offenders might have incurred had they remained outside prison. Since the offender population also have high rates of victimization themselves outside prison, without careful study it is not obvious whether their time in prison is safer or less safe than being on the outside.
To the extent offenders in prison have higher victimization rates, one could apply the same methodology that is applied to other victims to arrive at these costs. Of course, one must also decide whether to include only tangible losses which might be borne by taxpayers or society at large or to include the pain, suffering, and lost quality of life to the victim who is also a prisoner (see Section 5.1.1 for a discussion of this issue). However, one also must take care not to double-count. While most victimization surveys exclude the prison population from the survey, a released offender might indeed respond to a victim survey and report on an incident that occurred within the last few months while they were in prison. As another example, estimates of court costs associated with victimization would presumably include the offender who committed their crime while in prison – hence that crime would already have been accounted for elsewhere.
5.2.3.11 Lost Freedom to the Offender
Presumably, the lost freedom serving time in prison results in a utility loss to the offender. However, a recent study by Abrams and Rohlfs (2007) finds that the implied value of lost freedom to those charged with a crime is just equal to the value of their lost productivity. Lengyel (2006) provides very large estimates of the value of lost freedom by assuming
imprisonment is similar to the QALY loss from physical impairments that limit an individual’s mobility. However, it is not clear that such physical losses are comparable to time in prison. An alternative method of estimating the value of lost freedom might be to examine jury awards or legislatively mandated payments for false imprisonment in countries where these awards are made (see Cohen, 2005).
As discussed in Section 5.1.1, there is controversy about whether or not this should be valued. These costs have deliberately been excluded by Cohen et al. (1994), Anderson (1999), Brand and Price (2000), and Dubourg et al. (2005).
5.2.3.12 Losses to Offender’s Family
One potential social cost of incarceration is the disruption of lives for the family of an offender. Incarceration no doubt places a financial and emotional burden on the remaining spouse and children. In some cases, however, taking an offender out of the home might have a positive effect on the offender’s family – especially in cases such as domestic violence or a hard core drug abuser. Which effect is larger is a matter for future research. Although few studies exist on the impact of incarceration on the family members of the offender, a significant percentage of incarcerated offenders have children. Lengyel (2006) provides very large estimates of these costs to the family of offenders in New York State. However, he only considers the possibility that families (and taxpayers) are harmed by imprisonment and does not attempt to offset this by any positive outcomes. No estimates were included in Cohen et al. (1994), Anderson (1999), Brand and Price (2000) and Dubourg et al. (2005).
5.2.3.13 “Over-deterrence” and “Justice” Costs
For completeness, we mention two additional cost categories that have been identified in the literature but are unlikely to be estimated except in rare instances. Over-deterrence costs are collateral consequences of imposing sanctions on criminal offenders. For example, innocent parties who might be accused of committing a crime might take costly actions to avoid such allegations. This is most often thought to occur in regulatory crimes where individuals or companies might not engage in legal transactions for fear they will be construed as being illegal. As another example, guilty offenders might take costly actions to avoid detection if sanctions are very high. None of these costs are easily observable.
The cost of "justice" is primarily determined by society's willingness to take costly precautions to ensure innocent individuals are not accused of crimes. Thus, society spends more on costly court procedures than needed to convict wrongful offenders in order to protect the innocent. While conceptually a cost of crime, these costs are likely to be included in any estimates of criminal justice costs already delineated in earlier sections.
As discussed in Section 5.1.5, unlike the “bottom up” approach that attempts to estimate each component cost of crime, an alternative (or complementary) methodology is to estimate costs from the top down. Three methods have been used to date; revealed preferences, stated preferences, and life satisfaction (for details, see Cohen. 2008a).
The revealed preference approach has generally focused on estimating differences in property values based on crime rates. To the extent that home buyers take into account the risk of victimization when deciding whether or not to buy a home, we expect higher crime neighbourhoods to have lower housing prices controlling for all other factors that affect house prices (see Thaler, 1978, Rizzo, 1979, and Hellman et al., 1979). This effect might also be evident in wage rates (see Hoehn et al., 1987). However, since many types of crimes tend to move in similar directions, it is difficult to sort out the effect that one particular crime has on wage rates or property values. Instead, studies to date have tended to estimate the cost of an aggregate measure of crime such as the crime index. In theory, a comprehensive data set could isolate the effect of each crime type on housing prices. Bartley (2000) attempted this and was only slightly successful – again due to significant data limitations. One exception is the recent study by Linden and Rockoff (2006), who estimated the cost of a sex offence by examining housing prices nearby known sex offenders following the passage of laws requiring the registering and public availability of information on where sex offenders live. Gibbons (2004) found house prices in London to be more affected by levels of ‘low level’ crime like criminal damage and anti-social behaviour than by burglary, and suggested that these former crimes were being used as indicators of criminality by residents and potential residents.
While the revealed preference approach observes actual market prices and tries to infer the value of crime, stated preference methodologies ask respondents to provide their subjective evaluation of a public or private good. Oftentimes this is done through a public survey where respondents are asked to state their “willingness to pay” for a reduction in crime. Studies that have utilized this approach to estimate the costs of crime include Zarkin et al. (2000), Ludwig and Cook (2001), Cohen et al. (2004), and Nagin et al. (2006).
A relatively new approach to valuing crime is to infer values from life satisfaction surveys. Like stated preferences studies, data are based primarily on respondent surveys. The surveys do not ask for valuations; instead, they ask for a subjective evaluation of the respondent’s satisfaction with life. Moore (2006) analyzed the European Social Survey, which asks a question on “how happy are you” based on an 11 point scale as well as a question on neighbourhood safety, “How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in this area after dark?” Using multiple regression analysis he is able to estimate the equivalent income required to maintain one’s level of “happiness” while varying levels of subjective safety. This provides an estimate of an individual’s value of safety from crime. Cohen (2008b) conducts a similar analysis in the U.S.
The advantage of top-down approaches to valuation is that they can in principle value the ‘more difficult’ impacts of crime which cause problems for the bottom-up, component-based approach due to issues such as data availability. An example would be the costs associated with changing travel patterns to reduce exposure to crime risk. If we assume that prices revealed in markets or expressed in surveys reflect all of the impacts of crime, then the value of these more difficult impacts will be included in estimated prices. However, this assumption places significant demands on the individual’s ability to access and process value-relevant information, which raises questions about its validity and the meaning of the resulting value estimates.
Table 5.1
Taxonomy of Crime Costs – Anticipation and Consequences of Crime
Crime Cost Category |
Who Bears the Cost |
Section |
ANTICIPATION OF CRIME |
|
|
Precautionary Expenditures |
Potential victims |
5.2.1.1 |
Avoidance behaviours |
Potential victims |
5.2.1.1 |
Fear of Crime |
Potential victims |
5.2.1.2 |
Crime prevention programs |
Society/government |
5.2.1.3 |
- Government |
Society/government |
5.2.1.3 |
- Non-government agencies |
Society |
5.2.1.4 |
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME |
|
|
Property Losses |
|
5.2.2.1 |
- Losses not reimbursed by insurer |
Victim |
|
- Losses reimbursed by insurance |
Society |
|
- Administrative costs of insurance |
Society |
|
Productivity Losses |
|
5.2.2.2 |
- Lost wages for unpaid workdays |
Victims |
|
- Lost productivity for paid workdays |
Society/employers |
|
Household Service Losses |
Victims/family |
5.2.2.3 |
Lost school days |
|
5.2.2.4 |
- Foregone wages due to lack of education |
Victim |
|
- Foregone nonpecuniary benefits of education |
Victim |
|
- Foregone social benefits due to lack of education |
Society |
|
Medical and Mental Health Costs |
|
5.2.2.5 |
- Losses not reimbursed by insurer |
Victim & family |
|
- Losses reimbursed by insurance |
Society |
|
- Administrative costs of insurance |
Society |
|
Pain, Suffering and Lost Quality of Life |
|
5.2.2.6 |
- Pain, suffering & lost quality of life |
Victim |
|
- Loss of affection/enjoyment, trauma |
Victim family |
|
Victim Support Services |
|
5.2.2.7 |
- Expenses charged to victim |
Victim |
|
- Expenses paid by service agency |
Society/government |
|
Legal costs associated with tort claims |
Victim/society |
5.2.2.8 |
Long-term consequences of victimization |
Victim family/Society |
5.2.2.9 |
Offender costs |
Offender |
5.2.2.10 |
Table 5.2
Taxonomy of Crime Costs – Response to Crime
Crime Cost Category |
Who Bears the Cost |
Section |
RESPONSE TO CRIME |
|
|
Police |
Society/government |
5.2.3.1 |
Prosecution |
Society/government |
5.2.3.2 |
Courts |
Society/government |
5.2.3.3 |
Legal fees |
|
5.2.3.4 |
- Public defenders |
|
|
- Private lawyers |
|
|
Criminal Sanctions |
Society/government (sometimes offenders) |
5.2.3.5 |
Victim and Witness Costs |
Victim/Witnesses |
5.2.3.6 |
Jury Service |
Jurors |
5.2.3.7 |
Victim Compensation |
Society/government |
5.2.3.8 |
Offender Costs |
|
|
- Productivity |
Offender/society |
5.2.3.9 |
- Injury/death to offender while incarcerated |
Offender/society |
5.2.3.10 |
- Loss of freedom to offender |
Offender |
5.2.3.11 |
- Offender’s family |
Offender’s family/society |
5.2.3.12 |
Overdeterrence Costs |
|
5.2.3.13 |
- Innocent individuals accused of offences |
Innocent “offenders” |
|
- Restrictions on legitimate activities |
Society |
|
- Costs of additional detection avoidance by offenders |
Offenders |
|
Justice Costs |
Society |
5.2.3.13 |
Decisions by victims to report incidents to the police are not made at random: Bowles, Garcia & Garoupa (2007). They likely reflect a range of influences including the value of the loss at issue, the type of offence and whether the victim has insurance. Reasons for reporting (and for not reporting) crime are explored in many crime victim surveys. The reasons may include intimidation of victim s by offenders and also psychological factors.
The potential significance of a relationship between the scale of loss and the victim’s propensity to report an incident to the police is that great care is needed when ‘grossing up’ from the costs of recorded crimes to estimates of the costs of recorded plus unrecorded crime. The criminology literature recognizes a difference between the two categories of events but the distinction has been rather neglected in much of the work by economists on the cost of crime. It is very convenient to make the assumption that the costs of recorded and unrecorded offences are about the same. But the overwhelming evidence from victimisation surveys is that this assumption is not tenable empirically.
The decision by police as to whether to record a reported incident as a crime is likewise a far from random matter. In some countries there is monitoring of the reliability of recording and the recording process is covered by tight standards or protocols. The time it takes for the police to go through the recording process is likely to influence the reporting propensity. If the process is time-consuming or unpleasant then it will be used less often. An important consequence of this is that the number of police in an area may influence the reported crime rate via its effect on the degree of pressure under which the police are working. This ‘endogeneity’ of crime reporting was a central plank of the early work on measuring the volume of crime: (R. Carr-Hill, N. Stern 1979).
There is evidence of ‘under-reporting’ of crime on a large scale by both households and business. From the British Crime Survey the proportion of offences against households that ‘became known to the police’ is known to be much higher for property offences (over 90% of motor vehicle thefts) than for violent and sexual offences (less than 50% for many categories of offences): (insert ref to Bowles et al 2007). It is known that a significant proportion of crime against business goes unreported. Surveys of crime against business suggest that over 50% of businesses do not report all offences against them to the police, and that more than 10% of firms report none of the offences to the police:(British Chambers of Commerce 2004).
The proportion of crime that is recorded can be captured through the ‘multipliers’ used by government agencies such as the Home Office to reconcile estimates of the volume of crime derived from victim surveys with the number of crimes recorded in official police statistics.
Elsewhere in this project we argue that when estimating the victim cost component of crime it is desirable to distinguish between losses from crimes that have been reported and the (generally more minor) ones that haven’t been reported.
There is significant evidence that misuse of drugs and alcohol is associated with a substantial proportion of crime, with the implication that a reduction in the scale of misuse could reduce the volume and thus the aggregate costs of crime. Drug trafficking is itself a major criminal activity in many economies. But it is very difficult to detect and thus its scale is difficult to estimate with any reliability: (C Godfrey et al. 2002);(A. Healey et al. 1998).
An important danger when looking at the costs of substance misuse is that of double-counting. Many offenders have substance misuse issues, and it is possible to make estimates of the aggregate costs of these offences. But this is simply another way of describing offences. A burglary is a burglary whether it is committed by a substance user or an abstainer.
The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) i s based in Lisbon. Its web site contains national reports for each of years 2003, 04 and 05 for all member states. These reports follow a standard format and include reports on offending by drug users.
Cost of human trafficking
(R Lewis 1999)
The costs of crime against business and government can be very significant. A high proportion of businesses are known from a variety of surveys to be victims of crime. This ranges from low value, high volume offence types such as criminal damage, shoplifting, pilfering and burglary to high value low volume offences such as major fraud. The principal sources of data about business victimisation are national business surveys.
In the UK a victimisation survey of retail and manufacturing premises was conducted first by the Home Office in 1994 (C Mirrlees-Black, A. Ross ) and repeated a number of times subsequently: (J. Shury et al. 2005). Business organisations conduct surveys in some countries, such as the annual survey conducted by the British Retail Consortium, for the latest of which see (British Retail Consortium 2007). There are also comparative studies covering a number of countries. In a one-off study of the cost to business of crime Bamfield (2004) reports findings from a survey of major European retailers in 16 countries for the financial year 2001-2002. The business costs of crime and violence are routinely estimated by the World Economic Forum for 131 major and emerging economies and each country is ranked on the degree to which its score is contributing to the country’s global competitiveness.
A survey of Australian businesses’ experience of crime was first conducted in Australia in 1993: (J. Walker 1994). It ha s been repeated subsequently. It distinguishes cost s by the size of enterprise.
In 1996 there was an international survey of 130,000 randomly selected employees in 32 countries around the world (D. Chappell, V. Di Martino 1998). The first ICBS survey of commercial businesses’ experiences of fraud, corruption and other crimes was largely confined to the retail sector: (J. J. M. Van Dijk, G. J. Terlouw 1996;J. J. M. Van Dijk et al. 2005)]. In follow-up work the focus ha s been particularly on corruption, fraud and extortion. It was conducted in nine central-eastern European capital cities in 2000:(A. Alvazzi del Frate 2004).
In addition to survey s by national governments and international organisations a number of accountancy and consulting firms publish surveys. The Global Retail Theft Barometer covers 32 countries in North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific: Centre for Retail Research (2007). Based on data from 820 of the largest retail corporations with combined sales of £447 billion ($948 b.) representing 16% of European retail sales, 13% North American and 5% of Asia-Pacific sales, it estimates that total global shrinkage (stock loss from crime or waste expressed as a percentage of retail sales) cost retailers in the 32 countries £49,808 million (US$ 98,630 million), equivalent to 1.36% of their retail sales. Retailers in most countries thought customer theft (shoplifting) was their biggest problem, responsible for 42.0% of shrinkage or £20,906 million ($41,504 million). But the US, Canada, and Australia perceived employee theft to be larger than shoplifting.
Ernst & Young conduct a regular survey of the incidence of fraud amongst large corporations:(Ernst & Young 2000). KPMG has carried out surveys (KPMG 2007) as have PwC.
The costs of crime against particular business sectors have also been quite widely studied, although particular care is needed with some of the studies commissioned by business or sector advocacy groups. The use of the criminal law to protect certain kinds of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is particularly popular in sectors where producers may be vulnerable to losses that are individually small but collectively large. For example film and music piracy may involve large numbers of citizens downloading copies of albums or films from the internet or large numbers of pirate producers selling counterfeit CDs and DVDs. The private incentives of film or music production companies are not sufficient to justify the resources required to identify offenders and to bring legal actions for recovery of damages under the civil law. In order to protect the industry and the interests of future consumers who might otherwise be starved of new music and new films, the government may agree to criminalise the piracy activities and to use police and other public resources to enforce the prohibition of piracy.
Estimates of the scale of the costs of this kind of crime are sometimes rather extravagant. For example a method sometimes used is to make estimates of the number of people who have down-loaded a film and then to assume that all these individuals would have been prepared to pay the going price of a ticket to see the film in the cinema, or to be a genuine copy of the film. This obviously ignores the fact that the download is basically costless, and that only a fraction of down-loaders would actually have paid to watch the film in a cinema or to be a genuine copy. Nevertheless the aggregate losses of revenue can be very substantial, to the point that they may plausibly be reducing the expected returns on investments in new films or albums. Hollywood studios have claimed that film piracy cost them $6.1bn (£3.3bn) in lost revenue in 2005. Piracy in China alone apparently cost the film industry $2.7bn (£1.5bn) in 2005, according to a study by a major global movie body, the Motion Picture Association. For details see: http://www.mpaa.org/2006_05_03leksumm.pdf
In the UK a police unit dedicated to combating movie piracy and those responsible for the manufacture and distribution of pirated films has been launched in London. In partnership with the Federation Against Copyright Theft (FACT), the new unit will pursue individuals and groups profiting from the sale of fake DVDs.
Fraud, corruption (D. Irrera 2007)
Government departments, and non-commercial organisations more generally, are subject to a range of criminal offences. Fraud of various kinds, including tax evasion and social security fraud, accounts for large losses in some economies: [tax evasion & SS fraud refs.]. The procurement operations of government departments are vulnerable to corruption.
Staff of government agencies are vulnerable to physical attack by members of the public. Common targets of violence include health service workers (particularly in emergency room settings), criminal justice system staff such as police officers, probation officers and prison staff and staff working in social security offices.
Some individuals offend persistently and/or frequently. When evaluating interventions that are aimed at reducing the offending propensity of specific offenders an understanding of likely future offending is essential in order to estimate the benefits from these programmes. There ha s been a significant amount of research in the criminology literature on offending profiles: (D. S. Nagin ),(J. Petersilia et al. 1978), (P. W. Greenwood et al. 1996), (A. R. Piquero et al. 2004;A. R. Piquero et al. 2001) . Less developed is the application of cost of crime estimates to offending careers. (Cohen 1998) estimated the lifetime costs of a high risk youth from age 14 onward who embarks on a crime career in the U.S. – including the cost of their criminal offending behaviour and heavy drug abuse (as well as lost wages from less than high school education). Cohen and Piquero (2008) updated this analysis with more recent data but also provided year-by-year estimates of costs imposed. (DeLisi and Gatling 2003) estimated the costs imposed by a group of 500 adult prison offenders by analyzing their prior histories. Welsh et al. (2008) examined the cost of a juvenile offending career from age 7-17 based on 500 inner-city youth.
A key role of cost of crime estimates is to act a s benefit measures in Cost-Benefit Analysis of criminal justice interventions and projects: (R. O. Zerbe, D. D. Dively 1994). The Home Office estimates of (S. Brand, R. Price 2000), for example, were used as the basis for evaluation guidelines supplied to analysts exploring the impact of the interventions comprising the Crime Reduction Programme in the UK: for the guidelines see (S. Dhiri, S. Brand 1999): for an application see (R. Bowles, R. Pradiptyo 2004). The application of CBA, and the closely-related tool of Cost Effectiveness Analysis, ha s been more thoroughly developed in other policy areas including health (Gold and others 1996), education, transport and the environment.
Other applications can be found in works in the US including application to the analysis of policing (J. Horowitz, E. Zedlewski 2006) and in the well-known analysis of criminal justice interventions in the State of Washington (S. Aos et al. 2001;S. Aos et al. 2007).
(W. S. Barnett 2007)
Reducing offending risk in children and young people
(A. Grogan-Kaylor, M. D. Otis 2003)
Gibbons, S., The Costs of Urban Property Crime, Economic Journal, 2004
Having considered the methodology for estimating the costs of crime and some of the areas of application of the methodology there are some important outstanding issues that have not as yet been fully resolved.
The incidence of crime is very far from random: (A. B. Atkinson, F. Bourguignon 1982)(Carroll and Jackson 1983) Carroll & Jackson (1989); Brantingham & Brantingham (1998); Fitzgerald et al (2004); Wallace et al (2006). Residents in poor neighbourhoods are typically more vulnerable to becoming victims of crime than residents in wealthier areas. Differential rates of private spending on anti-crime precautions and differences in the intensity of police patrolling are just two possible reasons for inequalities in victimisation risk: (T. Hung-Lin 2005);(A. Imrohoroglu et al. 2000). Proximity to neighbours with a higher propensity to offend is another.
Research conducted as part of the MMECC project has raised an important issue in the measurement of inequality arising from the treatment of crime. In England and Wales local recorded crime rates are one of the key components in the Index of Multiple Deprivation which is intended to enable comparisons of disadvantage across local areas. From the British Crime Survey data it can be shown that the proportion of offences reported to the police is lower in low income areas. The implication of this is that the distribution of deprivation is more uneven than is apparent from the distribution of recorded crime: Bowles, Garcia Reyes and Garoupa (2007).
This version of the review (January 2008) is far from a complete survey of the whole cost of crime literature. It represents work in progress, with some sections at present somewhat under-developed.
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